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In the short time since the late Pope John Paul II, now designated John Paul 
the Great, delivered his controversial March, 2004 address on the morals of 
providing, withholding, declining and discontinuing tube-feeding of persons in 
the condition often called "persistent vegetative state," a number of cases 
have arisen and interpretations offered of the papal statement, some of 
them seriously affecting patient care. I I wish here to offer a reading of the 
papal address that is more permissive than some in thelt)ptions it preserves 
but, I think, faithful to the text and the wider tradition of Catholic moral 
reasoning in medical ethics. Much of my discussion will focus on the more 
general topic of assisted food and drink, rather than on the special issues 
raised by the condition misleadingly called "persistent vegetative state." 
I hasten to state that I am not a moral theologian, nor a theologian of 
any sort. Rather, I wish to offer reasons why the recent statement might, 
when construed within the larger context of Christian thought on ethical 
issues in medical practice, reasonably be judged consistent with that 
thought and with a position on responsible discretionary interventions with 
such patients that I find sensible and attractive. My proposed interpretation 
is offered as provisional, contingent on further exploration of these issues 
in the light of religious and secular moral inquiry. Moreover, we need to be 
sensitive to the fact that Pope John Paul II's March, 2004 allocution is part 
of a tradition periodically developed and refined. Future doctrinal 
statements may clarify the tradition's implications, rendering obsolete 
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some of today's judgments about what Catholic medical ethics requires, 
recommends, and permits. 
I will proceed by first focusing on several key phrases in the papal 
statement, indicating for each how it might reasonably be seen to cohere 
with traditional Catholic ethical inquiry and moral common sense. In later 
sections, I relate the recent allocution to a number of recent, chiefly secular 
bioethical discussions of related issues, especially those of euthanasia and 
care of the incompetent. 
I. Some Key Passages 
Certain passages in the papal text have engendered much 
controversy and elicited criticism. We begin by examining some of them in 
this section. In the next, I offer interpretations of these texts to clarify them 
and suggest that many of the criticisms are misguided. 
"The sick person in a vegetative state, awaiting recovery or a natural 
end, still has a right to basic health care (nutrition, hydration, cleanliness, 
warmth, etc .... and) the right to appropriate rehabilitative care ... " 
"I should like particularly to underline how the administration of 
water and food, even when provided by artificial means, always represents 
a natural means of preserving life, not a medical act. Its use, furthermore, 
should be considered in principle, ordinary and proportionate, and as such 
morally obligatory, insofar as it seems to have attained its proper finality, 
which in the present case consists in providing nourishment to the patient 
and alleviation of his suffering. 
"The evaluation of probabilities, founded on waning hopes for 
recovery when the vegetative state is prolonged beyond a year, cannot 
ethically justify the cessation or intelTuption of minimaf care for the 
patient, including nutrition and hydration. Death by starvation or 
dehydration is, in fact, the only possible outcome as a result of their 
withdrawal. In this sense it ends up becoming, if done knowingly and 
willingly, true and proper euthanasia by omission." 
Significantly, the pope quotes from his own 1995 encyclical 
Evangelium Vitae: "By euthanasia in the true and proper sense must be 
understood an action or omission which by its very nature and intention 
brings about death with the purpose of eliminating all pain." 
"[N)o evaluation of costs can outweigh the value of the fundamental 
good which we are trying to protect, that of human life. Moreover, to admit 
that a decision regarding a man's life can be based on the external 
acknowledgment of its quality, is the same as acknowledging that 
increasing and decreasing levels of quality of life, and therefore of human 
dignity, can be attributed from an external perspective to any subject, thus 
introducing into social relations a discriminatory and eugenic principle." 
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II. Some Interpretive Suggestions 
John Paul II's talk was given to an audience at a meeting organized 
by the Pontifical Academy for Life and the International Federation of 
Catholic Medical Associations. This audience, he could assume, would be 
familiar with Catholic training in medical ethics and would not need to 
have all relevant exceptions and context spelled out for them.2 
A) John Paul II describes providing artificial nutrition and hydration 
(hereafter, ANH) as both an "artificial means" and "a natural means of 
preserving life" (para. 4). This is apt to cause confusion. I think the passage 
is best read as indicating that ANH is an artificial way of doing a natural 
thing, as would be using a cell phone to call for help when trapped in a 
dangerous situation. 
B) The papal statement maintains that ANH is "not a medical act" 
(para. 4). Again, this is perplexing. It is, after all, a procedure performed by 
medical personnel using medical equipment in a medical setting. Some 
even prefer the term "medically assisted nutrition and hydration (MANH)" 
to "rutificial nutrition and hydration," which I use here.3 In what respect is 
it, then , not a medical act?4 I suggest that the point is that providing 
nutrition is not a healing, therapeutic or disease-preventive intervention. It 
has much, and arguably more, in common with what is commonly 
described as nursing care, such as keeping a patient clean and warm. My 
colleague, the eminent theologian Lisa Sowle Cahill , compares ending 
ANH to removing respirators , and certainly there are important 
similarities.5 Still, there are also differences that may rriatter. Breathing is 
naturally an involuntary motion, what followers of Aquinas sometimes call 
"an act of man" rather than a human action . In contrast, food and drink 
always enter our bodies through some agent's voluntary action , usually 
one's own.6 That indicates an interesting and relevant way in which 
receiving ANH is closer to the natural and ordinary means of getting food 
and drink than is being on a respirator to natural and ordinary breathing. 
The fact that, in ANH, the means and setting of supplying food and drink 
are more technological does not suffice to make their provision narrowly 
medicinal rather than nutJitive care. 
Might it be cOlTectly said that inserting and maintaining the feeding 
tube ru·e medical acts, even if the feeding and watering are not?7 Perhaps 
so, though this claim seems to rely on a dubious ontology of human action, 
according to which inserting and maintaining the tube that feeds the patient 
are somehow different actions from that of feeding her. If the feeding is not 
this, one wonders, what is it? In any case, I think the larger point is that 
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little depends on this classificatory matter. Some people think it important 
because they reason that, since the language of "ordinary means" and 
"extraordinary means" comes from medical ethics, if ANH is not medical, 
this distinction cannot apply to it, and thus no purchase is afforded the 
claim that it may sometimes be morally optional because extraordinary. 
This, however, is a non sequitur. If providing someone food and drink is 
excessively burdensome to her or others, it is not morally obligatory, 
regardless of whether the provision would be "a medical act" and whether 
or not it fits some restricted technical definition of an "extraordinary 
means." 
C) What of the address's explicit claims that ANH "should be 
considered in principle ordinary and proportionate and as such morally 
obligatory" (para. 4)? Is withholding ANH or even discontinuing it, then, 
never permitted? 8 That is not the only way to construe this claim, and I am 
not convinced that it is the best. First, compare the ordinary statement: 
What you borrow you ought in principle to return. Here, "in principle" 
means such return is a duty normally considered in isolation and by itself 
(and not in the sense in which medieval thinkers used the term in se), in the 
abstract, in general. Adapting this use here could allow that ANH might still 
become extraordinary and disproportionate in some circumstances, and be 
licitly withheld or ended when it has. To be sure, the text admits of a 
stricter reading, supporting a more stringent rule. My suggestion is that the 
new statement on ANH and persistent vegetative state (hereafter, PVS) be 
read as continuous with traditional Catholic thinking in health care ethics, 
so that considerations of proportion are relevant and possibly dispositive, 
so long as the action is not of a type that in virtue of its nature can never be 
justified, is malum in se.9 But should the recent papal sta(ement be read 
precisely as branding withdrawal of (effective) ANH as malum in se? 
Again, it admits of such a reading, but at this point and waiting further 
clarification, I think that a looser reading plausible, available, and open. 
A year after the papal allocution, the National Catholic Bioethics 
Center in the USA announced its position that, "Food and water should be 
provided for all patients who suffer PVS unless it fails to sustain life or 
causes suffering," insisting that "(r)emoval of food and water is permissible 
only when they no longer attain the ends for which they are provided." 10 
However, it is not clear these two claims are themselves fully consistent. 
What of the case where ANH is not futile but attains its end of prolonging 
life, yet does so only by causing some burden so substantial as to be 
disproportionate? PVS may rule out the patient's feeling pain, but this is 
not the only form that a disprop0l1ionate burden may take. I I The US 
Bishops ' Conference has defined "disproportionate means" as measures 
"that in the patient's judgment do not offer a reasonable hope of benefit or 
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entail an excessive burden, or impose excessive expense ... "12 Of course, a 
PYS patient is in no position herself to judge "benefits" to be "reasonable" 
or a "burden ... excessive." As Father Ford, of Australia's Chisholm Centre 
for Healthcare Ethics, affirms, such patients "are unconscious, unaware of 
themselves or their environment" and because "awake but not conscious," 
they are unable to show their wishes. 13 Nevertheless, it is not clear that 
morally ending (or withholding) ANH requires that the patient must make 
this judgment about, and at the time of, a proposed intervention. It may 
sometimes be enough that the burdens of initiating or continuing ANH go 
beyond some reasonable standard that the patient has endorsed previously 
and in the abstract, especially in a carefully drafted and reflectively 
informed advance directive. 14 
How might her receiving ANH burden someone, specifically a PYS 
patient and her loved ones? Even if pain and discomfort are not issues for 
them, which can be questioned, and the expense is normally but not always 
modest, the toll in infections and other physiological complications may 
become so great that she could reasonably decline to continue despite the 
lethal result. Certainly, the costs to caregivers in time, stress, and fatigue 
can be so substantial it is morally permissible for them to decline further 
provision even in the face of the patient's likely death. 
Does all this evacuate the papal injunction of its point, perhaps even 
content? Not at all. The point is that nourishing those unable to eat is 
valuable and justified quite independently of their "quality of life" or 
prospects for recovery. It should be the ordinary (here meaning typical, 
normal) thing to do, in no need of further justification. This is a truth it is 
important to assert in our time, when even some scholars in Christian 
medical ethics are wont to reject, sometimes deriding it as "vitalism," the 
claim .that anyone's life is valuable in a way that J,arrants protection 
regardless of her disability, illness, etc. To the contrary, it is discontinuing 
such care that will always require special justification. That is not to say, 
however, that such justification can never be given, even when ANH 
prolongs life, and I do not read the papal text as excluding that possibility 
tout court. I retum to both these points below. 
D) The 2004 address does allow that ANH might permissibly be 
withdrawn when it cannot achieve its "proper finality" (para. 4). Here, as 
the papal text makes clear, what is important is that the ends relevantly 
appropriate to the provision of food and water are nourishment and 
alleviating discomfort. Tubal delivery that cannot achieve this goal is futile 
and, at best, optional. 
To be sure, there are problems in the offing at this point. Some insist 
that determinations of a form of treatment's futility themselves presuppose 
judgments of a patient's quality of life. Others distinguish such "qualitative 
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futility" from a more empirical "physiological futility." To be sure, 
judgments that some type of care is futile are sometimes abused, used 
merely to camouflage the view that someone's life is not worth saving. 
Likewise, some determinations of futility do depend on evaluations of 
evidence. And efforts to eliminate any room for subjective judgment or 
assessment of evidence can have the effect of eliminating virtually any 
legitimate scope for considerations of futlity.15 For all that, it seems to me 
that a generally serviceable, attractive, reasonable, and objective account of 
futility can be given. Often we can make do with an account that holds a 
form of care for a type of illness to be futile when it has not achieved its 
more immediate physiological goals to any appreciable extent in the last 
hundred suitable patients within a region. 16 
Eating and drinking usually bring someone many advantages besides 
deliverance from hunger and thirst, of course, and they are often 
undertaken with these results chiefly in mind - pleasures of the palate, 
convivial enjoyment, a sense of one's welfare being furthered, the 
interpersonal bonding that can be both manifested and cemented by 
sharing goods. The point is that the "proper finality" of eating is achieved 
in nourishment in the sense that this is its chief function, telos, point in 
naturelbiology, though not necessarily the eating agent's foremost aim, 
motivating thought, or conscious and adopted personal objective. ANH that 
doesn't nourish and hydrate is futile treatment in the relevant sense, the 
one, as we saw, sometimes called physiologically futile. 
E) The pope stresses that "evaluation of probabilities ... cannot 
ethically justify the cessation or interruption of minimal care for the 
patient, including (even artificial) nutrition and hydration" (para. 5). Must 
ANH, therefore, be started and maintained no matter what si'c!e effects are 
likely? I do not think the statement should be interpreted that narrOWly. It is 
saying that evaluation of the probability of the patient's recovery is not 
necessary in order to make a determination of the medical and moral 
necessity of ANH. That is because such contingency would improperly 
suggest that the value of the patient's life hinges on its "quality", 
specifically, on the likelihood of her substantially recovering. That is false. 
The patient's life is valuable, just as graced with dignity as yours or mine, 
irrespective of her health. Nevertheless, the likelihood of both the nutritive 
effectiveness of ANH and of various untoward side-effects remains morally 
always relevant, and they should be continually monitored and assessed. I 
see nothing in the address that gainsays that. 
F) What of the text's excluding the possibility that our "evaluation of 
costs can outweigh the value of' human life, explicitly ruling out appeal to 
any "external acknowledgment of its quality . . . as acknowledging that 
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increasing and decreasing levels of quality of life can be attributed from an 
external perspective to any subject," which latter step is described as 
"introducing into social relations a discriminatory and eugenic principle?" 
(para. 5,6) There are several important and valid points made here. First, 
the sick and disabled have a serious (even equal) claim on our help. 
Second, only the person herself can determine at what point the burden of 
a form of intervention (whether or not it properly counts as a medical 
treatment) is too much for her. Presumably, a duly designated sunogate can 
try to detenrune and apply the patient's wishes, but none of us, separately 
or collectively, may substitute our judgment on what sort of life is worth 
living or saving. 
That is not to say, of course, that the subject's own judgment is 
infallible, nor that it should always be the conclusive consideration. The 
papal statement is careful to indicate an asymmetry here. No one but the 
patient herself may properly terminate ANH on the grounds that its 
burdens to the patient (pain, discomfort, expense, intrusiveness, 
restrictions, inconvenience to and deprivation of others, especially loved 
ones) have become disproportionate to its benefits to her (continued life). 
However, that does not mean that the patient must have the last word, no 
matter what it is. On the contrary, the pope does not rule out our relying on 
our own best judgment, rather than the patient's, when we think that 
ANH's benefits to her outweigh its burdens. This may seem unfair, and the 
thoughtless will complain that it is "cruel." However, it is not unfair, it is 
just asymmetrical, and the implicit guideline is that we need to take care to 
en, if sometimes we must, always on the side of life. It matters crucially 
why (the reasons for which) the medical team withdraws care and, in the 
case of the patient herself, it matters crucially why she asks that it be 
withdrawn. 17 As Kant, the father of modern autonomy,' affirmed, not every 
preference is to be honored but only those wherein the agent acts free from 
pathological preferences and out of respect for her own and others' 
inherent dignity as persons. 18 The patient whose choice to end ANH or 
other care is a choice for death over life ought not to be abetted in this 
decision. In fact, this sort of death-wish, and its accompanying act of self-
degradation, is one of the few places where the misused notion of "death 
without dignity" might find legitimate application. Privileging life over 
autonomy, as the pope here does, may displease some, but it is not an 
unreasonable prioritization. It is just the opposite, in fact, and plainly has 
nothing whatever of the character of genuine cruelty. 
III. Withholding ANH in the Context of Euthanasia 
We should now consider the papal claim that withdrawing ANH, 
thereby condemning the patient to "death by starvation or dehydration . .. as 
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the only possible outcome ... ends up becoming, if done knowingly and 
willingly, true and proper euthanasia by omission." (para.4) This is quite 
strongly worded. What is he saying here? Recall that John Paul II is careful 
in this address to quote from an earlier document where he sought to define 
euthanasia. There, he wrote that: "by euthanasia in the true and proper 
sense must be understood an action or omission which by its very nature 
and intention brings about death with the purpose of eliminating all pain ." 
(Evangelium Vitae, para. 65) 
This makes it clear that, as this pope understands the term, intention 
is a necessary condition for euthanasia, along with result. Of course, 
intentions should neither be restricted nor imputed artificially or in a 
contrived way. We also need to remember that means count crucially. We 
will often need to ask, how does an agent reasonably mean/plan (i.e., have 
it in mind) to get from her course of conduct C to her envisioned resultant 
state S1 if not through the intermediary (means) step of result S2? As 
indicated in this account, it constitutes euthanasia, morally and in fact, 
when an agent's relevant course of conduct is self-restraining - that is, 
omissive - but nevertheless routed to its planned, targeted resultant state 
through the intermediary step of the patient's death. Again, it matters 
crucially why (the reasons for which) she withdraws care. And, in cases 
where the patient can voice her wishes, it matters crucially the reasons for 
which she asks that it be withdrawn. Those in PYS are, of course, unable at 
the time of care to voice, or even have, such preferences. However, they are 
not the only such patients, and it can be instructive for us to widen our 
scope and consider what people are saying about withdrawing life-
sustaining treatment from, and even actively putting to death, neonates and 
other infants - especially those with severe mental deficiencies. 
Stephen Pinker, the prolific proponent and popularizer 'of so-called 
evolutionary psychology, wrote a controversial New York Times essay 
where he claimed, "It seems obvious that we need a clear boundary to 
confer personhood on a human being and grant it a right to life. Otherwise, 
we approach a slippery slope that ends in the disposal of inconvenient 
people ... (To recognize a right to life in all but only) members of our own 
species, Homo sapiens, ... is simply chauvinism; a person of one race could 
just as easily say that people of another race have no right to life. No, the 
right to life must come, the moral philosophers say, from morally 
significant traits that we humans happen to possess ... having a unique 
sequence of experiences that defines us as individuals and connects us to 
other people, . .. an ability to reflect upon ourselves as a continuous locus of 
consciousness, to form and savor plans for the future, to dread death and to 
express the choice not to die. And there's the rub: our immature (human) 
neonates don't possess these traits any more than mice dO."19 
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I think Pinker's implicit comparison of the differences between 
White and Black people to those between the human and the subhuman 
racially offensive. Moreover, we do not "confer personhood on" people, I 
nor "grant it" a moral right - note the term " it" - but rather recognize 
(acknowledge) their personhood and appreciate the rights that it grounds. 
Pinker notes that very few mothers who kill their one-day-old children 
(what he calls "neonaticide" as distinct from other "fi licide", that is, the 
killing of offspring) are tried, convicted, and imprisoned. He infers from 
this that we empathize with the very young victims. (He cites a study 
indicating that of 300 women charged with such crimes in the USA and 
Britain, none spent more than one night in jail.) Pinker explains this 
differential concern by speculating that evolution has equipped us to feel a 
certain detachment until the child shows himself or herself capable of 
survival and thus a good investment of time and attention. However, Pinker 
himself notes that these baby-killers are usually very young, unmaJTied, 
alone, poor, and desperate. That suggests a different explanation for 
society's clemency: it may be rooted more in our greater sympathy for the 
killers than in our lesser sympathy for their victims. Finally, it is true 
neither that we "happen" to possess personal attributes nor that only those 
who in fact possess them, or possess them at a certain time of their lives, 
are persons. Rather, these qualities are most plausibly seen as defining 
personhood in that a human person is a being that by its natural inclination 
properly and naturally tends to develop them. When a human being is not 
yet at the stage where they have developed, or is at the appropriate stage 
but is such that some internal or external misfortunes have thwarted their 
development (or ended them) these facts do not deprive her of personhood, 
causally or conceptually. In fact, it only compounds her mischance, and 
literally adds insult to injury, if we take this disability 1s grounds further to 
deprive her even of social protections and personal respect. 
Barbara Smoker, former president of Britain's National Secular 
Society, writes in a publication of the Council for Democratic and Secular 
Humanism, "I strongly feel that it is cruel, and therefore immoral, to 
preserve a baby 's life when there are such severe handicaps that chances of 
happiness are manifestly low. For life can, of course, be far worse than 
death ... (Acting) to starve seriously defective neonates to death - giving 
them only water, not milk ... is certainly better than keeping them alive -
but not as merciful as a quick, lethal injection ... Since we now have a 
social duty to limit our families, it is only sensible to limit them to those 
with a reasonable prospect of a normal human life . . . A newborn baby has 
very limited awareness, no idea of any future, and no real stake in life, 
(whereas, in contrast,) an older child has become a real little person, with 
personal relationships, a sense of his or her own identity, and an idea of 
purpose - the very things that give human beings human rights and status.20 
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What we need to remember, in the face of Smoker 's remarks, is that 
the principal way in which human life is valuable is rooted in the status and 
dignity of human personhood and does not derive from its usefulness for 
achieving happiness, having an idea of the future, and so on. Newborn 
babies are already and intrinsically persons, albeit little ones, and that 
status does not depend on what level of development they have achieved or 
will later achieve. H. Lagercrantz opines that "it is wrong to ask if 
euthanasia of infants should be legal. It is better to retain respect for a 
personal life defined as a human individual with consciousness or the 
potential to become conscious. Having set his definition like this, he feels 
entitled to say, with regard to deliberately withholding resuscitation and 
treatment from certain severely encephalopathological children "with a 
very limited ability to develop a reasonable level of consciousness," that he 
"do(es) not regard this as euthanasia because the infant is not a conscious, 
or potentially conscious, person."21 
Garret Keizer, an essayist who sometimes writes for the leftist 
American political magazine The Nation, believes he has uncovered what 
really motivates those who wish to protect life and medicine from the 
professional deformity that he and others call physician-assisted suicide. 
"The light talks about protecting life and tradition, but on some level. .. it is 
mostly interested in protecting pain. The first is theological: the belief that 
pain holds the meaning of life ... The second reason ... is political: the 
belief that pain is fundamental to justice."22 
Keizer offers little reason for imputing this odd idea to his 
adversaries, and it seems like mere unfairness. To be sure, many religious 
people remind us that suffering is not an unalloyed ill and even biology 
shows its normal usefulness. They also know that deserved suffering is a 
necessary part of criminal justice, though most religious peoPle in the West 
are content these days to restrict the desirable types of suffering to the 
frustrations and restrictions of fines, incarceration and, at most, relatively 
painless execution. More to the point, one would certainly have difficulty 
locating a reputable religious ethicist who thinks that medicine has a 
legitimate role in increasing, maximizing, prolonging, or enabling patients' 
pain. So, Keizer's claim is merely mean-spirited fancy. 
Against what he imagines to be his adversaries ' fixation on 
"protecting pain," Keizer wants to make his stand with liberal democracy. 
"PAS (physician-assisted suicide) rests on two principles that are central to 
a liberal society. The first is that we are owners of our own lives . . . The 
second principle . . . is that we are collective owners of the culture we 
produce collectively. The debate over PAS is ... about who owns the 
medicine . . . And one thing more about the relevance of a Death with 
Dignity law to our democracy: we are free to try it OUt."23 
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Keizer's odd, left-libertarian view is rife with bad metaphors of 
ownership: owning our selves, owning medicine. It is unseemly for anyone 
to make so much depend on economic analogies, particularly someone on 
the Left. In any case, there is little substance to his reasoning, since it is 
difficult to make sense of his idea of owning ourselves - if this entitles us to 
kill ourselves, does it not also entitle us to sell ourselves, even to give 
ourselves away to others in permanent bondage? But what sense can be 
made of self-alienation? And how could it be a matter of right? I cannot 
only destroy, sell, or give away my couch legally, I can also rip it up when I 
feel like it. And I can do any of these merely according to my passing 
captice in the eyes of the law. Does Keizer's defense of PAS also bravely 
guarantee our moral tight to deface, even mutilate ourselves simply on the 
basis of a passing fancy? And should this entitlement also be legally 
encoded? If not, how and on what basis are these moral lines to be drawn? 
What sort of liberalism is it that could so casually commit itself to 
whimsical enslavement and mutilation? While John Locke spins in his 
grave, we would do well to remember this fact: those patients who exercise 
their Keizer-granted right to "try ... out" PAS can never learn from their 
experiment's failure. It is doubtful that this is what Mill had in mind in 
talking of the marketplace of ideas. 
Keizer also notices that many disabled people, and those who love 
them, are starting to notice the implications of condoning infanticide and 
mercy-killing for people who can no longer take care of themselves, 
ambulate, and so on. Some do not like those implications, and are 
becoming more vocal in expressing their misgivings. "Groups like Not 
Dead Yet," he observes, "view any laws for assisted death as a threat to the 
very existence of the disabled. At least they claim to. After reading some of 
their literature, I suspect that what they see is not as 'Inuch a threat as an 
insult. 'Death with Dignity' becomes a loaded term in the presence of Life 
with Disability. Complaints about the 'indignities' ofterminal illness -loss 
of control over bathroom functions, complete lack of mobility - are 
naturally going to seem offensive to those who have struggled to assert 
their dignity under similar conditions."24 Of course, the insult to the 
disabled in this nasty rhetoric is not merely perceived; it is inherent in 
much talk of "death with dignity." 
John Robertson, an expert in issues of biomedical law, strains to 
justify his strange view that parents ought to be legally empowered to make 
care decisions because of what appears to constitute a plain conflict of 
interest. "Because parents (and other children) will bear the burdens of 
caring for the child with severe impairments, they should have the right to 
refuse resuscitation or treatment in ... (severe) cases."25 He continues, "If 
one lacks altogether the capacity for meaningful symbolic interaction, then 
one lacks the charactetistics that make humans the object of moral duties . . . 
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(T)he mental disability in such cases is so extreme, so far from those cases 
in which children may be said to have valid interests in living, that they 
arguably do not threaten to harm the important values underlying the 
injunction against quality of life assessments in cases of disability."26 
However, we should reject Robertson's claim that disabled babies 
lack relationship. Rather they already are related to us as somebody's son 
or daughter, grandchild, brother, sister, nephew, niece, etc. The question is 
how we respond to them -living up to (or failing in) these relationships. 
The same holds true for PVS patients. 
This shift from concern to avoid burden on patients (especially, their 
pain), to avoiding burden on parents (who Robertson, oddly, wants to 
empower to make decisions precisely because of their conflict of interest), 
shows that not all the impetus for infanticide is really mercy-killing, killing 
from (supposed) mercy for the patient. It also raises the question: which 
putative justification will come next? Avoiding burden to society? People 
who point out that the last century's chief advocates of euthanasia were in 
the Third Reich are nowadays denounced in high dudgeon. We have 
become accustomed to hearing that things are entirely different now, 
because the Reich supported euthanasia for the supposed good of society 
while the current trend appeals to individual autonomy and dignity. But as 
the rationale for infanticide shifts from avoiding the patient's pain to 
respecting her wishes, and now to enabling her potential caregivers to spare 
themselves expense and trouble, just how far are we from the Nazis' 
rationale for euthanasia? 
Finally, consider Eduard Verhagen. Dr. Verhagen is clinical director 
of the Pediatric Clinic in the University Hospital of Groningen, a Dutch 
hospital whose physicians have a policy of sometime perfonning mercy 
killings on terminally ill newborns. In a recent NPR interView about his 
clinics' activities, he said, "(W)e felt that in these children the most 
humane course of action would be to allow the child to die, and even 
actively assist them in their death . .. (F)rom a medical point of view, it is 
very important to be strict on the protection of life. And in extreme cases, 
the best way to protect life is to sometimes assist a little bit in death."27 
I will not belabor the nasty absurdities of human infanticide and 
protecting life (whose? from what? one wonders) by helping "a little bit in 
death." One important lesson from reflecting on the disgraceful statements 
I have discussed, and it would be easy to multiply such examples, is that 
we all need to learn to accept and value our common dependence, and 
recognize that there is no indignity in it, while it is manifestly degrading to 
judge some people to have lives worth neither saving nor living.28 
May,2006 143 
IV. Withholding ANH: Intervention and Its Discontents 
Bearing those truths in mind can help us act more responsibly in 
making decisions about starting and discontinuing ANH. These decisions 
can get especially complicated with patients in PVS. We need to 
remember, for example, that diagnosis of PVS can be quite unreliable. Dr. 
Allen Counter reports that a 32-year-old woman whose doctors concluded 
that she, while "unresponsive to sensory stimuli, devoid of any intellectual 
function , and in a persistent vegetative state," consistently turned towards a 
music box playing in her room, and "began to smile and make sounds, as if 
she were enjoying" it.29 He reports that he found himself "emotionally 
moved by her struggle for human definition through the single modality of 
hearing," that her doctors began responding to her more personally ("in 
some cases, holding her hand and trying to speak with her"), and that she 
continued to enjoy the music for some years . He concludes that "Her case 
was a reminder of how much we do not understand about the brain, and 
that even people in an apparent vegetative state may have ways of 
connecting to the world around them."30 
For all that, there can be reasons to withhold or discontinue ANH that 
are neither rooted in nor routed through the euthanasist's aim of 
"eliminating all (the patient's) pain" through her death. Dr. Muriel Gillick 
holds that feeding and watering by tube are "seldom warranted for patients 
in the final stage of dementia," because they have "few if any benefits and 
there is considerable potential for harm."3l She bases this conclusion on 
evidence that ANH has not been shown to lead to longer lives as compared 
with those who do not receive it, can cause diarrhea and nausea (so that 
neither nutrition nor hydration really results), and often leads to infections. 
In addition , demented patients frequently behave so as t~ pull out the tubes 
and need to be restrained, causing distress, fear, and diminished 
autonomy.32 Moreover, ANH provides neither the felt satisfaction of eating 
nor the social interaction of being spoon-fed. Gillick's views have been 
controverted and I certainly possess neither the knowledge nor the 
expertise to make a judgment.33 My point is that the factors she cites are 
relevant, not excluded as such. Indeed, even the magnitude of financial 
costs to the patient and her family can be relevant, though this would be 
less true in a more just system of health care allocation.34 
The US Catholic Bishops have stated that, while "there should be a 
presumption in favor of providing nutrition and hydration to all patients, 
including patients who require medically assisted nutrition and hydration," 
such intervention is morally required only when it "is of sufficient benefit 
to outweigh the burdens involved (by its provision) to the patient."35 
Indeed, the burdens to others, e.g ., relatives, can also be legitimately be 
considered. Robert Orr reminds us that "For. .. years, traditional moral 
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theology distinguished between ordinary and extraordinary means of 
saving life. Ordinary means were those that were not too painful or 
burdensome for the patient, were not too expensive, and had a reasonable 
chance of working."36 Other measures involving "undue burden(,) were 
extraordinary and thus · optional." The distinguished Protestant ethicist 
Gilbert Meilander rightly affirms that "we may refuse treatments that are 
either useless or excessively burdensome. In doing so, we choose not death 
but one among several lives open to us." His point is that sometimes, in 
withholding or discontinuing ANH, we act licitly because all that "we aim 
to dispense with (is) the treatment, not the life." In contrast, "if! decide not 
to treat because I think a person's life is useless, then I am taking aim not at 
the treatment but at the life." In this context, it is worth noting Father Ford's 
claim that "to prolong indefinitely the life of a patient in a permanent 
unconscious state does not seem to respect (her life's inherent) W0l1h" and 
his alarming suggestion, cast as a question, that "subject(ing someone) to 
years of unconscious life sustained by MANH (medically assisted nutrition 
and hydration)" shows a "lack of respect for (that) patient's inherent 
dignity."37 I find it difficult to interpret this statement in a way that does not 
imply that it is such a life itself that is being targeted for termination 
because somehow unworthy, rather than the treatment that is being 
terminated despite and not because of the fact that doing so shortens the 
patient's life. 
Even the idea of accepting some undesirable side effects of actions 
taken for good ends is complicated. We should not take too literally the 
metaphor of "weighing," Meilander sagely observes. "On what scale one 
'weighs' benefits and burdens is a question almost impossible to answer. 
Even more doubtful is whether we can 'weigh' them for someone else. My 
own view is that when we make these decisions for oursel~es, we are not 
weighing anything. We are deciding what sort of person we will be and 
what sort of life will be ours. We are making not a discovery but a 
decision." He cautions against being "too quick to assume that feeding 
tubes are 'treatment' rather than standard nursing care ... It is hard to see 
why such services as turning a patient regularly and giving alcohol rubs are 
standard nursing care while feeding is not. "38 Meilander's trenchant 
discussion reminds us of our moral tradition 's familiar insight that, as 
Father Ford nicely summarizes it, "Human life is a gift of God; it is a basic 
good of the person and not merely a means to other goods." 
v. Conclusion 
I have here tried to offer an interpretation and partial defense of the 
recent papal statement on ANH and PVS, placing this form of care and this 
condition in the larger contexts of recent discussion of care option, and 
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euthanasia for other persons who have diminished or unrealized capacities, 
especially newborns. Mine can be seen as a kind of middle view between 
those who deem the lives of some unworthy of prolongation on the one 
hand and, on the other hand, an unconditional requirement to administer 
food and water artificially, provided only that it nourishes and hydrates, no 
matter how much doing so burdens the patient and her family and others. 
That is not to say I find the two alternatives equal. The more restrictive is a 
plausible, serious position, clearly consistent with responsible Christian 
thinking in medical ethics. In contrast, those who deem disabled lives 
unworthy of saving are spokespersons for what John Paul II repeatedly and 
trenchantly labeled an "anti-life culture" or, more starkly an "anti-
culture."39 
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